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Introduction and summary
In this article, we provide an empirical analysis of the
determinants of whether an individual purchases health
insurance coverage. We describe the relationship be-
tween health insurance, health costs, and health care
utilization of the elderly, using data from the Health
and Retirement Survey and the Assets and Health
Dynamics among the Oldest Old. We show how health
costs and health care utilization depend upon access
to health insurance for individuals aged 50 and older.
Given the public interest in extending health in-
surance coverage to those who are currently unin-
sured, it seems worthwhile to better understand why
some people do not purchase health insurance. For
example, 2000 Democratic presidential candidate Al
Gore advocated that individuals aged 55–64 be allowed
to “buy in” to Medicare. The idea was that eligible
individuals would have to pay for Medicare coverage,
but would potentially pay less than the price of pri-
vately available insurance. Medicare would potentially
be cheaper because of the cost advantages associated
with the group coverage that Medicare provides. By
understanding the determinants of the health insurance
purchase decision, we can better understand how pro-
posed reforms may affect health insurance coverage.
First, we investigate the factors influencing a per-
son’s decision to purchase health insurance. A General
Accounting Office study found that in 1998, private
health insurance premiums for a family of four ranged
from $3,000 to $14,000 per year. Although health care
coverage can be expensive, very few households are
unable to buy private health insurance. Nevertheless,
many households choose to be uninsured rather than
purchase private health insurance.1 Therefore, we as-
sume that even low-income households are able to
buy basic health insurance.
Given that almost all individuals in our data are
able to purchase health insurance, the most likely
reason that they remain uninsured is that they expect
their health costs without insurance to be significant-
ly lower than their health costs with insurance. We test
four potential reasons why this might be the case:
1) adverse selection in the insurance market—because
insurers cannot distinguish between high-cost and low-
cost individuals in a group—leading to potentially
prohibitive costs of health insurance for healthy indi-
viduals; 2) moral hazard—the idea that if the price of
something is low, people use more of it—leading to
potentially prohibitive costs of general insurance;
3) potentially prohibitive administrative costs of pro-
viding health insurance for private individuals; and
4) many of the uninsured already receive explicit insur-
ance through Medicaid and implicit insurance through
hospitals that will treat indigent patients, which may
obviate the need for them to purchase additional
health insurance.
Most studies of the health insurance purchase
decision focus on the importance of adverse selection
and moral hazard as potential reasons why individu-
als may not purchase insurance. Our results provide
evidence that neither adverse selection nor moral
hazard is the key determinant of the health insurance
purchase decision. We find no evidence that adverse
selection makes private insurance too expensive and
only moderate evidence that moral hazard may make
private health insurance prohibitively expensive. How-
ever, we find significant evidence that high adminis-
trative costs drive up the price of private insurance.
Moreover, we find a large amount of evidence that
the existence of Medicaid and implicit insurance ob-
viates the need for individuals to purchase additional
health insurance. This last result suggests that changes61 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
in government-provided health insurance, such as al-
lowing younger individuals to “buy in” to the Medicare
program, would likely have a small effect on the health
insurance coverage of older Americans. The data show
that many of those currently “uninsured” already have
access to low- or no-cost health care coverage from
the government and hospitals.
Data: Health and Retirement Survey and
Assets and Health Dynamics among the
Oldest Old
We use data from the Health and Retirement Sur-
vey (HRS) and Assets and Health Dynamics among
the Oldest Old (AHEAD). These two datasets are
collected by the same organization and have a similar
sample design for much of the sample period. Both
contain detailed information on health costs, health
insurance, and demographics.
The HRS is a sample of non-institutionalized2
individuals aged 51–61 in 1992. Spouses of these in-
dividuals were also interviewed, regardless of the
spouse’s age. The HRS includes both a nationally rep-
resentative core sample and an additional sample of
blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents. A total of
12,652 individuals in 7,608 households were inter-
viewed in 1992 and re-interviewed in 1994, 1996, 1998,
and 2000, creating up to five separate responses for
each individual.
The AHEAD is a nationally representative sample
of non-institutionalized individuals aged 70 and older
in 1993. Like the HRS, spouses of AHEAD respondents
were also interviewed, regardless of age. Also like the
HRS, the AHEAD dataset includes both a nationally
representative core sample and additional samples of
blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents. A total of
8,222 individuals in 6,047 households were interviewed
in 1993. These individuals were interviewed again in
1995, 1998, and 2000, creating up to four separate
responses for each individual.3
In order to assess the quality of the HRS/AHEAD
data, we present means of several key variables of in-
dividuals aged 50 and older and compare them with
aggregated statistics from other sources.4
Consider sources of insurance first. Table 1 shows
that most individuals receive employer-provided in-
surance, including insurance from current employers,
past employers, and unions, as well as from the spouse’s
current employer, past employers, and unions.5 Almost
all individuals over age 65, as well as those who draw
disability insurance, are eligible for Medicare. Individ-
uals with low incomes and asset levels are also eligible
for Medicaid. Those not eligible for any of the above
forms of insurance are faced with either purchasing
private health insurance or having no insurance at all.
Table 1 shows that many individuals who do not have
access to government- or employer-provided health
insurance choose not to purchase insurance on the pri-
vate market. Of our sample, 17 percent have private
insurance, while 7 percent have no insurance. Much
of the remainder of this article is devoted to under-
standing the health insurance purchase decision for
people who are neither covered by employers nor by
the government.
The central variable of interest in our study is the
level of health costs paid by the household. For sin-
gle households, we compute this as the individual’s
health costs. For married households, it is the sum of
the husband’s and wife’s health costs. Health costs are
the sum of insurance premiums, drug costs, and costs
for hospital, nursing home care, doctor visits, dental
visits, and outpatient care. See the appendix for a more
detailed description of these variables. For our sam-
ple, mean household out-of-pocket health costs are
$2,527 per year and mean health costs for those aged
65 and older are $2,716. The U.S. per capita average
is $2,831 for non-institutionalized households headed
by an individual aged 65 or older (Federal Interagen-
cy Forum, 2000). This means that health costs in the
HRS/AHEAD are likely significantly below the na-
tional average when accounting for the institutional-
ized population.
One important reason why average health costs
in the HRS/AHEAD data are below the national av-
erage is that individuals in the HRS/AHEAD spend
far fewer nights in a nursing home. Households head-
ed by someone aged 65 or older spend 7.2 nights in a
nursing home per year in our sample versus 15.8 nights
in the aggregate statistics (National Center for Health
Statistics, 1999).6 Selden et al. (2001) find that 9 per-
cent of total aggregate health costs and 13 percent of
costs paid out of pocket arise from nursing home visits.
Why is there a market for health insurance?
In the next two sections of this article, we describe
some of the important determinants of the health in-
surance purchase decision. Then, we provide empiri-
cal evidence on these issues.
The most obvious reason people purchase health
insurance is to limit uncertainty associated with cata-
strophic health costs.7 The idea behind health insurance
is that uncertain health expenditures are diversifiable
risks. That is, health insurers provide health insurance
to many individuals. While there is a great amount of
uncertainty about how much insurers must pay out for
any individual, there is very little uncertainty about aver-




Variable Mean deviation Observations
Fraction with insurance plan
Employer-provided 0.50 0.50 46,991
Private 0.17 0.37 46,991
None 0.07 0.25 46,991
Medicaid 0.10 0.29 46,991
Medicare 0.17 0.38 46,991
Medical costs (1998 dollars)
Out of pocket costs 744 2,516 41,876
Drug costs 753 2,523 41,807
Insurance premiums 1,085 3,197 34,251
Total household expenses 2,527 5,057 33,005
Health care utilization
Nights in nursing home 4.09 34.65 42,638
Nights in hospital 1.69 6.13 42,418
Doctor visits 6.95 9.99 41,757
Had outpatient surgery 0.13 0.24 42,663
Saw a dentist 0.65 0.48 36,315
Did not take prescribed drugs 0.09 0.28 36,316
Demographics
Fraction married 0.54 0.50 46,953
Good health 0.69 0.46 41,606
Economic resources
Assets <$50,000 0.32 0.47 45,627
Assets >$50,000<$200,000 0.34 0.47 45,627
Assets >$200,000 0.34 0.48 45,627
Income <$5,000 0.05 0.22 45,874
Income >$5,000<$30,000 0.49 0.50 45,874
Income >$30,000 0.46 0.50 45,874
Working 0.38 0.48 46,442
Sources: HRS/AHEAD data and authors’ calculations.
Therefore, even if the health insurer is risk averse, by
pooling health costs of many individuals together, the
insurer faces very little risk. As a result, the insurer
cares only about expected medical expenditures of
the individual when setting the insurance premium.
Suppose that the firm’s only cost of providing
health insurance is medical expenditures. In other
words, we ignore administrative costs to the insurer.
Also, assume that there are a large number of indi-
viduals in the market, and that all of these individuals
face the same distribution of health costs. If markets
are perfectly competitive, the firm’s expected profit
is zero. If the insurer makes profits, new health insur-
ance providers will enter the market and bid down
insurance premiums to the expected health costs of
the individual. Therefore, insurers will offer insurance
to individuals at “actuarially fair” prices, that is, prices
equal to the expected health costs that individuals face.
Assuming that individuals are risk averse, they
would rather pay their expected health costs than
face the possibility of extremely high health costs.
Therefore, individuals will be better off purchasing
actuarially fair insurance. As we noted in
table 1, however, many people do not pur-
chase insurance. The most common ex-
planation why people do not buy insurance
is that it is impossible to buy actuarially
fair insurance. Next, we examine why
this is so.
Why doesn’t everyone purchase
health insurance?
Above, we argued that people should
purchase health insurance to reduce un-
certainty if their expectation is that they
will pay the same amount for health care
whether or not they are insured. However,
insured individuals are, on average, likely
to pay more than the uninsured. Below,
we highlight four reasons for this and cite
existing evidence for each of the reasons.
First, prices of health insurance may
be potentially high because of adverse
selection. Adverse selection occurs when
there are high health cost individuals and
low health cost individuals in a group,
but health insurers cannot distinguish be-
tween the two.
Recall that if markets are competi-
tive and there are no administrative costs,
insurers will set the price of health insur-
ance equal to the average medical expen-
diture of individuals who purchase health
insurance. If individuals with low health costs are able
to reveal that, on average, they will have low health
costs, health insurers will charge those individuals low
insurance premiums.
However, in practice it is very difficult for insur-
ers to distinguish between the two groups. Individuals
may know whether they are “high cost.” However, this
information is not available to the insurer of a group
plan. For example, Blue Cross/Blue Shield health in-
surance merely requests home address, date of birth,
sex, whether the individual smokes, and whether the
individual wants maternity coverage.
As a result of not being able to distinguish between
high-cost and low-cost individuals, insurers charge
everyone (conditional on the information listed imme-
diately above) the same price for health insurance.8 If
only high health cost individuals purchase health in-
surance, and health insurers charge premiums equal
to average health costs of people who buy health in-
surance, then the cost will be relatively high. Although
low health cost individuals may value health insurance
at more than the cost to insurers of providing it to63 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
them, since they are risk averse, they may value it at
less than what insurers charge to provide health in-
surance to high health cost people. In this scenario,
the low health cost individuals will not purchase
health insurance.9
If insurers could distinguish between high-cost
and low-cost individuals, they would provide insur-
ance to low health cost individuals at a price equal to
their expected health costs. This would make low-
cost individuals better off. Insurers would still charge
high-cost individuals their expected health costs,
making them no worse off.
Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) survey the evidence
on adverse selection. They argue that empirical work
has repeatedly documented its importance when com-
paring insurers that offer multiple plans. For example,
individuals who opt for Medicare health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) (that offer less generous ser-
vice than most Medicare plans but cover some servic-
es, like drug costs, that most Medicare plans do not
cover) are more likely to have consumed few medical
services in the past than those who do not opt for
Medicare HMOs.
Many researchers also cite the high price of pri-
vately provided health insurance as evidence that ad-
verse selection does drive up the price of health
insurance. For example, Gruber and Madrian (1995)
document that Blue Cross/Blue Shield health insur-
ance for a family of four in New England costs
$10,310 in 1998 dollars.10
However, it is not clear in the above example
that individuals who buy Blue Cross/Blue Shield are
any less healthy than those who decide not to pur-
chase insurance. Moreover, many studies that consid-
er the health insurance purchase decision have found
relatively little evidence that adverse selection exists
in the market for health insurance (see Cardon and
Hendel, 2001, for example).
The second reason insurance may be so expen-
sive is the cost of administering plans for large em-
ployers. Administrative costs account for 10 percent
to 15 percent of the costs of the health plans (Cutler
and Zeckhauser, 2000). However, these costs are po-
tentially higher for insurance plans administered to
small groups of people. For example a Congressional
Budget Office (U.S. Congress, 1988) study found that
large firms (10,000+ workers) pay 35 percent less than
small firms (one to four workers). Gruber and Madrian
(1995) argue that this price difference reflects some
combination of adverse selection and administrative
costs. Given that it is not obvious that adverse selec-
tion is more serious for small employers than large em-
ployers, it is likely that the cost difference is largely
from the lower administrative costs at large firms.
Pauly (1986) finds that administrative costs may ac-
count for 50 percent of the cost of “Medigap” health
insurance plans. 11
Moral hazard is the third reason health insurance
costs are high. Moral hazard is a consequence of
downward sloping demand curves: If the price of a
good becomes cheaper, people buy more of that
good. People purchase health insurance to reduce the
costs of medical procedures. For example, many “in-
demnity” plans like Blue Cross/Blue Shield allow
people to obtain whatever health care they wish, but
the insurer pays most of the price. If individuals have
a 20 percent co-payment, then the price of medical
services is only 20 percent of what it would be with-
out insurance. This potentially leads people to use
medical services that are of very little value to them.
Recall that if markets are competitive, then the price
of health insurance is equal to expected medical ex-
penses of purchasers of health insurance plus admin-
istrative costs. The high level of medical services
consumed by insured individuals will be reflected in
the price of health insurance.
Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Ex-
periment (Manning et al., 1987) suggests that a 1 per-
cent rise in the price of health care services results in
a .2 percent reduction in the quantity of health care
services consumed, or a price elasticity of .2. Given
that the price of health care services differs greatly
between those with and without insurance, moral
hazard potentially leads insured individuals to con-
sume far more medical services than is ideal, leading
to expensive medical insurance.
A final reason many people may find private medi-
cal insurance expensive is that they already receive
insurance from the government or through hospitals.
Medicaid provides insurance to individuals with low
income and assets. Moreover, hospitals that receive
federal funding cannot turn away indigent patients.
Therefore, individuals with low income and assets do
not need to purchase insurance. They already have it
provided explicitly by Medicaid or implicitly by hos-
pitals. This explanation has received less attention than
the other explanations (see Cutler and Gruber, 1996,
for an exception). However, as shown in the empiri-
cal work below, this may be an important oversight.
With these explanations in mind, table 2 describes
the problems associated with universal government
insurance relative to employer-provided health insur-
ance and private insurance. The main advantage of
nationalizing health insurance, such as expanding
Medicare to all individuals aged 55 and older, is to
overcome adverse selection problems. 12 Because the64 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 2
Problems with health insurance, by payment system
Employer-
Nationalized provided Private
Administrative costs yes yes yes
Moral hazard yes yes yes
Adverse selection no some yes
government would expand coverage to everyone, both
the healthy and unhealthy would be covered. Indeed,
Akerlof (1970) points out that most individuals aged
65+ were uninsured before Medicare was passed into
law and argues that adverse selection was one reason
for the low insurance rates of these people. However,
nationalizing health care would do little if anything
to overcome high administrative costs or moral hazard.
Administrative costs would potentially be the same
for insurance plans administered by large private in-
dustries and the government. And moral hazard is in-
herent in the very nature of insurance contracts and is
not specific to the insurance provider. Therefore, ar-
guments in favor of nationalizing health insurance must
rest on the assumption that adverse selection exists in
the marketplace for health insurance coverage and
partly on the assumption that, because of risk aver-
sion, health insurance makes people better off.
Health insurance coverage, health costs,
and health care utilization
In this section we provide some new empirical
evidence on the four potential reasons individuals do
not purchase health insurance We find no evidence of
adverse selection and limited evidence in favor of moral
hazard and high administrative costs. Instead, we be-
lieve the main reason some individuals do not purchase
insurance is that they are already receiving insurance,
either through the government or implicitly through
hospitals.
In order to assess the importance of administra-
tive costs, we compare individuals with private insur-
ance with individuals with employer-provided insurance.
Recall that Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) find that
administration accounts for 10 percent to 15 percent
of the total cost of health insurance at large firms. Our
goal is to find out whether individuals who purchase
private insurance face significantly higher administra-
tive costs than those who receive health insurance
through their employer.
Table 3 shows household health costs by age group
and health insurance type. For households headed by
someone aged 50–64, health insurance premiums are
$1,154 per year for those with employer-provided
plans. The Employee Benefit Research Institute (1999)
reports that employers contribute an average of $3,288
to their employees’ health insurance. Therefore, the
total cost of employer-provided insurance premiums
is the sum of the employee contribution plus the em-
ployer contribution, or $4,442. Compare this amount
with insurance premiums for households headed by
individuals aged 50–64 with private insurance. These
households spend $4,067, on average.
This would imply that the total cost of a private
plan is slightly less than the cost of an employer-pro-
vided plan. 13 However, not only do households with
private insurance spend more on insurance premiums
than households with employer-provided insurance,
they also have higher out-of-pocket expenses. This may
reflect the higher deductibles and co-pays of private
health insurance policies. When we sum up the insur-
ance premiums paid by the individual and the firm
plus what the individual pays out of pocket, the total
health cost for households with employer-provided
insurance is $5,489 (a $3,288 employer contribution
plus total household expenses of $2,201) and the total
cost for private insurance is $5,871, a difference of 7
percent. Given that administrative costs constitute
about 13 percent of insurance costs for employer-pro-
vided plans, these costs make up 20 percent of private
insurance costs.
Moreover, table 3 shows that households with
private insurance receive fewer medical procedures
than households with employer-provided health insur-
ance. This may reflect the fact that private insurance
does not usually cover pre-existing conditions. Given
that those with private health insurance consume few-
er medical services than those with employer-provid-
ed insurance, the cost (net of administrative cost) of
private health insurance is likely lower than the cost
(net of administrative cost) of employer-provided in-
surance. Therefore, the calculation of administrative
costs above likely understates the administrative cost
of private health insurance.
The second potential reason people do not purchase
health insurance is adverse selection, which implies
that only the most unhealthy purchase private insurance,
which makes premiums prohibitively expensive for
healthy people. However, the evidence
presented in table 3 refutes this explana-
tion. Fully 81 percent of people aged
50–64 with private insurance report that
they are in good health. However, only
65 percent of the uninsured do likewise.
Therefore, the uninsured are more likely
to be unhealthy than those who purchase
private insurance. Comparing those older65 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 3
Descriptive statistics by age group
Employer-
provided Private None Medicaid Medicare
A. Ages 50–64
Fraction with insurance plan 0.67 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.04
Medical costs (1998 dollars)
Non-drug out-of-pocket costs 659 1,049 599 224 994
Drug costs 513 709 585 465 1,354
Insurance premiums 1,154 4,067 110 53 366
Total household expenses 2,201 5,871 1,277 712 2,792
Health care utilization
Nights in nursing home 0.241 0.008 0.627 5.350 1.527
Nights in hospital 1.067 0.809 0.932 3.146 2.791
Doctor visits 6.415 5.702 4.532 10.492 9.608
Had outpatient surgery 0.133 0.115 0.055 0.094 0.118
Saw a dentist 0.806 0.769 0.487 0.385 0.469
Did not take prescribed drugs 0.061 0.084 0.209 0.205 0.311
Demographics
Fraction married 0.683 0.583 0.451 0.201 0.454
Good health 0.822 0.809 0.646 0.235 0.332
Economic resources (1998 dollars)
Assets <$50,000 0.229 0.197 0.572 0.857 0.631
Assets >$50,000<$200,000 0.392 0.252 0.285 0.122 0.265
Assets >$200,000 0.379 0.550 0.143 0.019 0.102
Income <$5,000 0.020 0.058 0.189 0.275 0.148
Income >$5,000<$30,000 0.266 0.320 0.552 0.692 0.706
Income >$30,000 0.714 0.622 0.257 0.031 0.146
Working 0.729 0.653 0.554 0.071 0.072
B. Ages 65–79
Fraction with insurance plan 0.37 0.22 0.01 0.10 0.30
Medical costs (1998 dollars)
Non-drug out-of-pocket costs 732 651 605 333 647
Drug costs 669 1,394 880 585 1,055
Insurance premiums 1,255 2,408 211 149 433
Total household expenses 2,601 4,329 1,657 1,032 2,088
Health care utilization
Nights in nursing home 1.135 0.798 0.693 10.005 1.921
Nights in hospital 1.845 1.835 2.133 3.394 1.690
Doctor visits 7.776 7.260 6.336 9.305 6.650
Had outpatient surgery 0.174 0.159 0.077 0.102 0.120
Saw a dentist 0.762 0.701 0.463 0.384 0.594
Did not take prescribed drugs 0.040 0.095 0.136 0.139 0.110
Demographics
Fraction married 0.662 0.581 0.492 0.273 0.509
Good health 0.735 0.723 0.583 0.396 0.650
Economic resources (1998 dollars)
Assets <$50,000 0.153 0.156 0.468 0.760 0.323
Assets >$50,000<$200,000 0.357 0.343 0.321 0.186 0.369
Assets >$200,000 0.489 0.501 0.205 0.049 0.306
Income <$5,000 0.010 0.012 0.174 0.122 0.031
Income >$5,000<$30,000 0.429 0.528 0.626 0.831 0.661
Income >$30,000 0.561 0.460 0.200 0.047 0.308
Working 0.201 0.221 0.176 0.059 0.170
than 65 who purchase private Medigap health insur-
ance with those who only have Medicare or who have
no health insurance at all, again we see that those who
purchase private insurance are healthier than those
with no insurance other than Medicare. 14
The third potential reason individuals may not
purchase health insurance is the moral hazard prob-
lem. Those who are insured face a low price of health
care services, so they tend to consume more, which
drives up the price of premiums. Therefore, controlling
for health status, those who have private health insur-
ance should consume more health care services than
those who have no insurance. Table 3 shows that for
households headed by someone aged 50–64, those with
private health insurance are the least likely to spend a
night in a nursing home or a hospital. Those 50–64
with private insurance spend .01 nights in a nursing
home and .8 nights in a hospital per year, on average.
Those without insurance spend .6 nights in a nursing
home and .9 nights in a hospital per year, on average.66 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)
Descriptive statistics by age group
Employer-
provided Private None Medicaid Medicare
C. Ages 80 and older
Fraction with insurance plan 0.23 0.28 0.01 0.16 0.32
Medical costs (1998 dollars)
Non-drug out-of-pocket costs 1,773 1,241 477 646 1,018
Drug costs 765 1,230 1,086 391 944
Insurance premiums 832 2,033 73 165 345
Total household expenses 3,198 4,431 1,141 1,123 2,281
Health care utilization
Nights in nursing home 16.168 12.622 25.198 44.476 12.279
Nights in hospital 2.638 2.366 1.984 3.275 1.975
Doctor visits 7.446 7.094 6.055 8.442 6.146
Had outpatient surgery 0.151 0.132 0.102 0.080 0.099
Saw a dentist 0.631 0.558 0.422 0.274 0.454
Did not take prescribed drugs 0.019 0.055 0.094 0.060 0.066
Demographics
Fraction married 0.369 0.309 0.294 0.140 0.266
Good health 0.560 0.592 0.564 0.359 0.586
Economic resources (1998 dollars)
Assets <$50,000 0.214 0.241 0.433 0.804 0.391
Assets >$50,000<$200,000 0.375 0.376 0.328 0.154 0.341
Assets >$200,000 0.410 0.382 0.239 0.039 0.265
Income <$5,000 0.010 0.024 0.209 0.123 0.056
Income >$5,000<$30,000 0.640 0.719 0.657 0.867 0.789
Income >$30,000 0.350 0.257 0.134 0.010 0.155
Working 0.018 0.044 0.029 0.008 0.040
Sources: HRS/AHEAD data and authors’ calculations.
These findings are not consistent with the moral haz-
ard explanation. However, those with private insurance
on average have more doctor visits, are more likely
to have outpatient surgery, are more likely to see a
dentist, and are less likely to not take prescribed drugs
than those without insurance. These findings are con-
sistent with moral hazard. These patterns hold when com-
paring those older than 65 with private insurance with
those older than 65 who have either Medicare insurance
or no insurance. The privately insured older than 65 are
less likely to spend time in a nursing home or in a
hospital, but have more doctor visits, are more likely
to have outpatient surgery, are more likely to see a
dentist, and are less likely to not take prescribed drugs
than those without insurance or those who only have
Medicare.
One possible reason those with private insurance
are less likely to spend the night in a nursing home or
a hospital than those who are uninsured is that the pri-
vately insured are healthier. For two people with equal
health, the person with private insurance is potential-
ly more likely to spend time in a nursing home or a
hospital than the person without insurance. We return
to this issue when conducting our multivariate analy-
sis in the next section. Another possible reason that
complements the previous explanation is that hospitals
may have a difficult time turning away those without
insurance who are very ill. However, it is easy for
dentists and doctors offering elective surgery to turn
away the uninsured.
The final explanation why people do not purchase
health insurance is that they receive implicit insurance
through the government and hospitals. One testable
implication of this hypothesis is that those without
insurance pay less for a unit of health care services
than those with insurance. As discussed previously,
table 3 provides evidence that those without health
insurance consume only slightly fewer health care
services than those with private insurance. Note, how-
ever, that those aged 50–64 with no insurance spend only
$1,277 per year on health care, versus $5,871 per year
for those with private insurance. This difference in
costs is not completely an artifact of differences in in-
surance premiums either. Those who have no insur-
ance spend less on out-of-pocket expenses such as
drugs and co-pays than those with private insurance.
We also note that households with no insurance
are more likely to have low assets and low income
than those with private insurance. This is important
for two reasons. First, if an individual is indigent,
public and non-profit hospitals must treat them. There-
fore, low-asset individuals have implicit insurance
through hospitals. Second, individuals with low assets
are potentially eligible for Medicaid.67 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Individuals receiving Medicaid insurance con-
sume more medical services and spend less on health
care than any other group. That expenditures by
Medicaid beneficiaries, who have low income and
assets, are low is not surprising. After all, the govern-
ment spent $10,243 per Medicaid beneficiary aged
65 or older and $9,097 per blind or disabled individ-
ual in 1998 (U.S. House of Representatives, 2000).
One way to test whether Medicaid is a significant
source of insurance for the uninsured is to estimate
the probability that a household that is uninsured be-
comes covered by Medicaid health insurance two years
later. For uninsured households headed by someone
aged 50–64, there is a 9.2 percent probability that they
will be covered by Medicaid two years later. For house-
holds that purchase private insurance, there is only a
2.6 percent probability that they will be covered by
Medicaid two years later. This shows that individuals
with “no” insurance are more likely to be covered in
the near future. This may mean that individuals who
believe that they will be eligible for Medicaid in the
event of a household emergency feel less compelled
to purchase private health insurance than those who
do not believe that they will be eligible for Medicaid.
Multivariate analysis of determinants of
health costs
As noted above, we find that the total cost of
employer-provided insurance plans (that is, the sum
of costs paid by both employees and employers) is
similar to that of private plans for households headed
by individuals younger than 65. We also find that those
with no insurance pay much less for medical care than
those with private insurance. However, these compari-
sons are difficult to interpret because there may be
important differences in the quality of care provided
across health care plans. Even though having private
insurance leads to higher health costs than having no
insurance, having private insurance may also lead to
a significantly higher quality of care. In this section,
we use multivariate regressions to control for the
quality of health care received. Although we cannot
control for all aspects of health care quality, we can
control for many of the determinants of health costs,
such as nights in a hospital or nursing home. In this
analysis, we aim to explain differences in costs of
different types of health insurance, controlling for
health care utilization.
Table 4 presents estimates of some of the deter-
minants of health costs for the three age groups.
Each age group has two columns, the first one with
the health care utilization and health status measures
and the second one without. By controlling for health
care utilization in the regressions, we can assess whether
differences in health care utilization explain differ-
ences in health costs among households with differ-
ent types of insurance.
First, we need to infer administrative costs. Re-
call that although the total cost of employer-provided
insurance is similar to that of private plans for house-
holds headed by an individual younger than 65, house-
holds with employer-provided insurance consume more
health care services than households with private in-
surance. Here, we assess whether controlling for the
quantity of health care services consumed affects the
estimated cost differences for the two groups. We are
interested in whether the total cost of private insurance
is greater than the total cost of employer-provided in-
surance, holding utilization constant. Column 2 in
each category of table 4 provides evidence on this.
Controlling for the health utilization variables
those with employer-provided insurance pay $324 more
than those with no insurance. 15 Those with private
health insurance plans pay $4,132 more than those who
are uninsured and ($4,132 – $324 =) $3,808 more
than those with employer-provided health insurance.
Recall that firms contribute about $3,288 toward em-
ployees’ health insurance plans. Therefore, the total
cost of obtaining private health insurance is only $520
greater than the cost of obtaining private health insur-
ance. This estimate is not much different from the
difference in mean health costs described in the pre-
vious section. Therefore, our estimate of administra-
tive costs of private health insurance above is little
changed by the multivariate analysis.
Another finding in the previous section is that those
who are uninsured pay much less for health care than
those who purchase private insurance. However, those
who purchase private insurance are also more likely
to consume certain medical services, such as dentist
visits. Controlling for assets, income, education, race,
marital status, age, and health care utilization does
not affect the difference in health costs between those
who are insured and those who are uninsured. The gap
between health costs for households that are privately
insured and uninsured is $4,132, almost the same as the
difference in mean health costs shown in table 3. There-
fore, our central finding, that the uninsured are implic-
itly insured by hospitals and the government, is not
overturned by the multivariate regression analysis.
As further evidence on the hypothesis that “im-
plicit” insurance is important, it appears that greater
household resources lead to greater health costs, even
after controlling for health care utilization and health
insurance. This is true when the proxy for household
resources is assets, income, or education. In other words,68 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 4
Determinants of medical costs
Ages 50–64 Ages 65–79 Ages 80+
12121 2
Insurance type
Employer-provided 430 (99) 324 (122) 240 (418) 161 (435) 1,423 (911) 1,121 (937)
Private 4,057 (135) 4,132 (160) 2,037 (421) 1,892 (437) 2,681 (905) 2,524 (932)
Medicaid –172 (140) –550 (165) –241 (426) –653 (442) 47 (912) –681 (940)
Medicare 1,237 (168) 927 (197) 110 (416) –26 (431) 929 (901) 787 (927)
Demographics
High school graduate 225 (80) 161 (98) 241 (107) 228 (111) 580 (196) 400 (196)
College graduate 528 (105) 361 (130) 521 (153) 490 (159) 461 (332) 380 (329)
Age 58 (9) 48 (11) 46 (10) 31 (11) 114 (20) 78 (20)
Black –34 (83) 7 (100) –130 (132) –89 (137) –794 (251) –783 (250)
Married 1,751 (72) 1,623 (90) 1,848 (100) 1,499 (108) 1,987 (231) 1,358 (243)
Good health 159 (83) 316 (101) –32 (120) 70 (125) –353 (216) –37 (215)
Economic resources (1998 dollars)
Assets >$50,000<$200,000 531 (97) 736 (120) 344 (142) 484 (149) –516 (268) –231 (267)
Assets >$200,000 32 (126) 26 (152) 30 (247) –67 (255) 580 (387) 550 (387)
Income >$5,000<$30,000 55 (144) 11 (175) 376 (272) 247 (281) 2,038 (477) 1,854 (474)
Income >$30,000 –260 (77) 12 (95) –38 (122) 45 (126) –1,065 (499) –680 (485)
Working –2,937 (555) –2 (2) –2,455 (874) 19 (2) –9,237 (1,935) 17 (1)
Health care utilization
Nights in nursing home 66 (8) 23 (7) 44 (14)
Nights in hospital 28 (4) 41 (4) 77 (11)
Doctor visits 860 (176) 662 (196) 259 (389)
Had outpatient surgery 185 (92) 421 (107) 211 (185)
Saw a dentist 830 (126) 1,216 (162) 1,531 (377)
Did not take prescribed drugs –2,784 (684) –1,931 (904) –6,989 (1,961)
Constant
R2 0.148 0.180 0.091 0.121 0.065 0.117
Notes: For each age category, column 1 shows results with no health utilization controls, while column 2 shows results with controls.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Sources: HRS/AHEAD data and authors’ calculations.
poor people seem to pay less than rich people for the
same medical services. One caveat to this last finding
is that more affluent households may be paying more
for medical care because they are purchasing better
care. For example, they are potentially spending nights
in better hospitals and seeing better doctors.
Conclusion
This article provides an empirical analysis of the
determinants of whether an individual purchases health
insurance coverage. Using data from the Health and
Retirement Survey and the Assets and Health Dynam-
ics among the Oldest Old, we document the distribu-
tion of health costs and health care utilization of
individuals aged 50 and older. We show how health
costs and health care utilization depend upon access
to health insurance.
Of our sample, 6.5 percent are uninsured. We con-
sider four potential reasons for this. We show that ad-
verse selection is unlikely to be an important factor in
driving health insurance costs. There is some evidence
that administrative costs and overconsumption due to
moral hazard raise the cost of health insurance. How-
ever, we find a large amount of evidence that the ex-
istence of Medicaid and implicit insurance obviates
the need for individuals to purchase additional health
insurance. Given that many of the “uninsured” already
have access to low- or no-cost health care coverage
from the government and hospitals, we argue that
Medicare buy-in proposals (that is, proposals to
allow younger individuals to pay a premium to join
Medicare) would most likely have a small effect on
the health insurance coverage of older Americans.69 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
This appendix describes the coding of the two main
health cost variables used in our analysis: medical costs
paid by the individual and total costs of medical treat-
ment. Medical costs paid by the individual are equal
to the sum of drug costs, out-of-pocket expenses on
items other than drugs, and insurance costs. The total
cost of medical treatment is the total cost of medical
services (whether or not the individual pays for those
services) plus drug costs.
During waves one and two, members of the HRS
and AHEAD samples were asked different sets of ques-
tions. Wave three includes only HRS respondents. Dur-
ing waves four and five, HRS and AHEAD respondents
were asked the same questions.
Health cost information for wave one of the HRS
is limited to insurance premiums. The insurance pre-
mium question only refers to insurance purchased
directly from an insurance company or through a mem-
bership organization, such as the American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons (AARP). It does not include
employee contributions to employer-provided insur-
ance plans. Given that the information is incomplete,
we do not include wave one information. From wave
two onward of the HRS, however, we are able to com-
pute the total cost of medical treatment, the out of
pocket expenses, the drug costs, the cost of the insur-
ance, and the total medical costs the individual pays.
In wave two, the insurance premium question in-
cludes employee contributions to employer-provided
insurance plans and insurance directly purchased or
through a membership organization.
In wave two, respondents were asked whether they
had any hospital stays, nursing home stays, or visits
to a doctor. If they answered yes to any of these ques-
tions, they were then asked both the total cost and
out of pocket cost for the visit or stay.
Also in wave two, respondents were asked wheth-
er they purchased medicines prescribed by a doctor.
If they did, they were asked how much these medicines
cost per year. It is not clear whether the cost measure
refers to the cost paid by the individual or what the
pharmacy charges the individual and the insurer.
Nevertheless, we use this variable to determine the
drug costs variable, which is also added into the total
costs variable.
For wave three onward, total health costs and
out of pocket costs are clarified to include the amount
paid for doctors, hospitals, nursing homes, outpatient
surgery, dental expenses, in-home medical care, and
special facilities and services. Note that the costs (both
out-of-pocket and total) of outpatient surgery, dental
expenses, in-home care, and special facilities and ser-
vices are not included in wave two.
The procedure for determining the insurance costs
also changes for HRS waves three through five. The
insurance premium variable is now the sum of premi-
ums of all employer-provided insurance, Medicare
through HMO plans, supplemental plans, private/AARP/
professional coverage, and long-term care plans. Note
that in wave two, Medicare insurance costs are missing.
For wave one of the AHEAD dataset, we can
determine the out-of-pocket and total costs. The out-
of-pocket costs include the costs of nursing home stays
as well as “any part of hospital and doctor bills and
any other medical or dental expenses in the last 12
months.” We infer that drug costs are included in this
measure, although respondents were not asked directly
about drug costs. AHEAD wave one also asked what
policies besides Medicare respondents have, includ-
ing long-term care policies, and how much they paid
yearly for such policies. From this, we determine the
insurance costs of the respondent. We do not use
wave one in our analysis in this article, however, be-
cause the source of health insurance is incomplete.
For wave two of the AHEAD dataset, imputation
procedures for total costs, and out of pocket costs, in-
surance costs, drug costs, and medical costs are the
same as in waves three through five of the HRS.
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1Blue Cross/Blue Shield is willing to cover most people, although
its plans often do not cover pre-existing conditions.
2Institutionalized individuals include individuals in nursing homes.
3In 1998 and 2000, individuals in the HRS and AHEAD (as well
as an additional sample of older individuals) were asked the same
questions. In the HRS and AHEAD waves before 1998, many of
the questions asked were the same across the two datasets, allow-
ing us to merge the datasets. Because the health insurance and
health cost data are incomplete in wave one of both datasets, we
use waves two through five in our analysis here.
4Health costs and health care utilization in the survey instrument
are for the past two years or since the individual was last inter-
viewed. We divide health costs and health care utilization mea-
sures by the number of years since the individual was last interviewed,
or by two if the individual was never previously interviewed. We
dropped individuals with missing information on their health in-
surance coverage. This reduced the original sample from 49,843
person-year observations to 46,991 person-year observations. How-
ever, we kept individuals with missing information on other vari-
ables. There are 33,005 observations with health cost information.
5Employer-provided insurance includes individuals with federally
provided health insurance plans through the Veterans Administra-
tion and the Post Office. It does not include Medicare or Medicaid.
Individuals with federally provided health insurance also have
rather similar characteristics to people with employer-provided
insurance. The main difference is that households with federal
insurance tend to spend less on insurance premiums.
6Because the HRS/AHEAD sample was drawn from the non-in-
stitutionalized population—which excludes individuals in nursing
homes—it is not surprising that the number of nights in a nursing
home is lower in the HRS/AHEAD sample than the national aver-
age. Nevertheless, many HRS/AHEAD household members do
enter a nursing home after they are initially interviewed.
7There are other explanations for why people purchase health in-
surance. One is that people who purchase health insurance through
their employer pay for it with pre-tax dollars. If individuals face a
30 percent tax rate, they will be indifferent between spending $1,000
on medical expenses pre-tax and $700 post-tax. Unless they have
very large medical expenses, making them eligible to deduct medi-
cal expenses on taxes, they will pay for any medical procedures
not covered by employer-provided health insurance on a post-tax
basis. Therefore, there are important tax advantages to employer-
provided insurance. Another reason is that health maintenance
organizations potentially have market power in the market for
medical services and thus can bargain with hospitals for lower prices.
8Note, however, that pre-existing conditions, such as cancer, are
usually not covered by private health insurance plans.
9Note that if everyone purchased health insurance, average medi-
cal expenses would fall. Therefore, if low-cost individuals value
health insurance at more than the cost of providing insurance to
them, two equilibriums potentially exist: one in which health in-
surance is purchased only by high-cost individuals (resulting in
high health insurance premiums), the other in which health insur-
ance is purchased by everyone and the price of health insurance
premiums lies between the costs of high- and low-cost individuals.
10Gruber and Madrian (1995) document that Blue Cross/Blue Shield
was $8,640 in 1993. We adjusted this number to 1998 dollars us-
ing the medical care component of the Consumer Price Index.
11Medigap plans are private health insurance plans that cover health
costs that Medicare does not cover, such as co-pays. Note that
Medigap plans likely have high administrative costs because Medigap
only pays for the smaller expenses that Medicare does not cover.
12However, Gore’s “buy in” proposal still might have had problems,
given that the buy in would be voluntary. Healthy individuals would
potentially not buy into Medicare.
13Nevertheless, $4,067 is surprisingly small given that Gruber and
Madrian (1995) found that Blue Cross/Blue Shield charged over
$10,000 in 1998 dollars for private health insurance for a family
of four in New England.
14Note that differences in health costs amongst the different health
insurance groups fall greatly after age 65. Private health insurance
premiums fall from $4,067 for those aged 50–64 to $2,408 for
those aged 65–79. This is not surprising given that after age 65,
Medicare becomes the primary source of health insurance. Private
insurance pays many of the costs that Medicare does not pay. This
is why these health insurance plans are also often referred to as
“Medigap” plans.
15The omitted category in these regressions is an uninsured, low-
asset, low-income, white individual, who dropped out of high school.
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